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Thesis defence / AMfoRS
On November 19, 2024
Paolo MAISTRI - AMfoRS team
HDR thesis : habilitation to conduct research
Thèse HDR : habilitation à diriger des recherches
Composition of the jury
HDR thesis : habilitation to conduct research
Thèse HDR : habilitation à diriger des recherches
Composition of the jury
M. Guy GOGNIAT - Full Professor, Université Bretagne Sud, Rapporteur
Mme Karine HEYDEMANN - Senior Security Expert, Thalés, Rapporteur
M. Sébastien PILLEMENT - Full Professor, Nantes Universités, Rapporteur
M. Lilian BOSSUET - Full Professor, Université Jean Monnet-Saint Etienne, Examinateur
M. Régis LEVEUGLE - Full Professor, Grenoble INP, Examinateur
M. Jean-Baptiste RIGAUD - Associate Professor, Ecole de Mines Saint Etienne, Examinateur
Mme Karine HEYDEMANN - Senior Security Expert, Thalés, Rapporteur
M. Sébastien PILLEMENT - Full Professor, Nantes Universités, Rapporteur
M. Lilian BOSSUET - Full Professor, Université Jean Monnet-Saint Etienne, Examinateur
M. Régis LEVEUGLE - Full Professor, Grenoble INP, Examinateur
M. Jean-Baptiste RIGAUD - Associate Professor, Ecole de Mines Saint Etienne, Examinateur
Physical Attacks on Embedded Systems: To Understand and Protect
The use of embedded systems is increasing rapidly in various areas of life. As sensitive data is
often processed by embedded systems, some form of protection is required to prevent the leakage
or modification of information. The processing and protection algorithms themselves can be
vulnerable to attacks aimed at extracting this sensitive information. Physical attacks, in particular, are
a serious threat to embedded systems.
The most common physical attacks are auxiliary channel attacks and fault injection attacks.
Auxiliary channel attacks are passive physical attacks aimed primarily at exploiting the inadvertent
leakage of information from a device's physical characteristics. Fault injection attacks, on the other
hand, are active, possibly non-invasive, physical attacks in which the attacker intentionally attempts
to modify the normal behavior of a device during program execution by inducing one or more faults,
and then observing the erroneous behavior.
In this context, research into hardware security is based on several axes: hardware gas pedals of
cryptographic primitives or protocols; physical attacks, whether passive or active; and the design of
protection against these attacks, which necessarily requires the creation of models adapted to a
better understanding of the mechanisms exploited by malicious actors.
In this defense, we will review some of the research carried out in recent years in these three
areas, with a particular focus on fault injection attacks and their modeling.
often processed by embedded systems, some form of protection is required to prevent the leakage
or modification of information. The processing and protection algorithms themselves can be
vulnerable to attacks aimed at extracting this sensitive information. Physical attacks, in particular, are
a serious threat to embedded systems.
The most common physical attacks are auxiliary channel attacks and fault injection attacks.
Auxiliary channel attacks are passive physical attacks aimed primarily at exploiting the inadvertent
leakage of information from a device's physical characteristics. Fault injection attacks, on the other
hand, are active, possibly non-invasive, physical attacks in which the attacker intentionally attempts
to modify the normal behavior of a device during program execution by inducing one or more faults,
and then observing the erroneous behavior.
In this context, research into hardware security is based on several axes: hardware gas pedals of
cryptographic primitives or protocols; physical attacks, whether passive or active; and the design of
protection against these attacks, which necessarily requires the creation of models adapted to a
better understanding of the mechanisms exploited by malicious actors.
In this defense, we will review some of the research carried out in recent years in these three
areas, with a particular focus on fault injection attacks and their modeling.
Date
On November 19, 2024
Complément date
19/11/2024 - 14:00
Localisation
Complément lieu
Grenoble INP - Amphi Barbillon
46 avenue Félix Viallet
38000 Grenoble
Zoom link: https://univ-grenoble-alpes-fr.zoom.us/j/98727332944?pwd=1njMBbnUmKdlbY…
ID : 987 2733 2944
Code secret : 794512
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