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Laser Attacks against DDR Redundancy

Auteur(s) : P. Maistri, J.M. Dutertre, R. Leveugle

Doc. Source: Workshop on SecURity, REliAbiLity, test, prIvacy, Safety and Trust of Future Devices (SURREALIST'2018)

Hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms can be beneficial from a performance point of view, but on the other hand they can be vulnerable to passive and active attacks, such laser fault injections. Several countermeasures have been proposed to defend against fault attacks, based on hardware, information, or temporal redundancy. Here, we discuss higher-order laser fault injections against an implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard protected by the DDR temporal redundancy: this technique exploits both clock edges in order to speed up the computation, thus allowing for recomputation with limited latency penalty. Due to the more complex clock management, also the synchronization of the attack is more complex, and performing a successful attack is not an easy task, especially when combining a quick sequence of laser shots.